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James M. Buchanan Jr. (1919-)

Premio Nobel  1986

Economista norteamericano obtuvo el Premio Nobel de Economía en 1986 por su desarrollo de las bases contractuales y constitucionales de la teoría de la adopción de decisiones económicas y políticas.

Buchanan estudió en las universidades de Tennessee y Chicago y ejerció la docencia en las de Pennsylvania y Virginia. Especialista en Hacienda Pública, realizó interesantes estudios sobre el papel de la inflación como impuesto y sobre la naturaleza de la Deuda Pública. Es líder y teórico de la corriente Public Choice que analiza la forma en que se adoptan las decisiones públicas que influyen en el funcionamiento del sistema económico.

Textos en castellano de Buchanan incluidos en esta enciclopedia:

1. Buchanan, James M.  ¿Pueden los "estados benefactores" en democracia sobrevivir a las crisis financieras? (PDF)
2. Buchanan, James M. Apatía del contribuyente, inercia institucional y crecimiento económico (PDF) 
3. Buchanan, James M. La deuda pública y la formación de capital (PDF)
4. Buchanan, James M. ¿Qué deberían hacer los economistas? (PDF)
5. Buchanan, James M.  Ensayos sobre economía política
6. Buchanan, James M.  La perspectiva de elección pública

Otras obras:

• "Individual Choice in Voting and the Market", 1954, JPE
• "Social Choice in Voting and the Market", 1954, JPE
• Public Principles of Public Debt, 1958.
• "Positive Economics, Welfare Economics and Political Economy", 1959, J Law Econ
• Fiscal Theory and Political Economy, 1960.
• "Externality", with W.C. Stubblebine, 1962, Economica
• The Calculus of Consent: Logical foundations for constitutional democracy, con G. Tullock, 1962.
• "What Should Economists Do?", 1964, Southern EJ
• "Ethical Rules, Expected Values and Large Numbers", 1965, Ethics
• "Economics and Its Scientific Neighbors", 1966, in Krupp, editor, Structure of Economic Science
• Public Finance in Democratic Process, 1967.
• Demand and Supply of Public Goods, 1968.
• "An Economist's Approach to Scientific Politics", 1968, in Parsons, editor, Perspectives in the Study of Politics.
• Cost and Choice: An inquiry into economic theory, 1969.
• "Is Economics the Science of Choice?", 1969, in Streissler, editor, Roads to Freedom
• "Notes for an Economic Theory of Socialism", 1970, Public Choice
• Academia in Anarchy, with N.Devletoglou, 1971.
• "Equality as Fact and Norm", 1971, Ethics
• "Before Public Choice", 1973, in Tullock, editor, Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy
• The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan, 1975.
• "Public Finance and Public Choice", 1975, National Tax Journal
• "A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory", 1975, AER
• "Barro on the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem", 1976, JPE
• "Methods and Morals in Economics", 1976, in Breit and Culbertson, editors, Science and Ceremony
• Democracy in Deficit: the political legacy of Lord Keynes, with R.E. Wagner, 1977.
• "Markets, States and the Extent of Morals", 1978, AER
• Freedom in Constitutional Contract, 1978.
• What Should Economists Do?, 1979.
• The Power to Tax: the analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution, with G. Brennan, 1980.
• "The Homogenization of Heterogeneous Inputs", with R.D. Tollison, 1981, AER
• "The Domain of Subjective Economics: Between predictive science and moral philosophy", 1982, in Kirzner, editor, Method, Process and Austrian Economics
• "Order Defined in the Process of Emergence", 1982, Literature of Liberty
• The Reason of Rules: constitutional political economy with G. Brennan, 1985.
• Liberty, Market and the State, 1986.
• Economics: between predictive science and moral philosophy, with G. Brennan, 1988.
• Explorations in Constitutional Economics, 1989.
• The Economics and Ethics of Constitutional Order, 1991.